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Exploring Behavioral Responses 
of Motorists to Risk-Based 
Charging Mechanisms 
Stephen Greaves, Simon Fifer, and Richard Ellison 
This paper reports the behavioral response of motorists in Australia to 
a variable-rate charging scheme designed to encourage safer driving 
practices and reduce exposure to crash risk, specifically kilometers 
driven, nighttime driving, and speeding. The study involved a 5-week 
before period of Global Positioning System monitoring to establish 
how motorists drove normally, followed by a 5-week after period of 
Global Positioning System monitoring in which charges were levied and 
changes assessed. Incentives were paid to motorists for the difference in 
the charges between the two 5-week periods. Vehicle kilometers trav-
eled (VKT) was reduced by 10%, although the sample was evenly split 
into motorists with increasing VKT and those with decreasing VKT. 
The proportion of distance speeding fell by 4.7%; this finding, when 
coupled with decreases in VKT, implied a net reduction of more than 
40% in kilometers spent speeding. Three-fourths of the participants 
reduced their speeding. Exit interviews with a cross section of partici-
pants highlighted the practical difficulties of reducing kilometers but 
(more encouragingly) reinforced the potential to reduce speeding. 
Recent estimates suggest that motor vehicle accidents cost the Aus-
tralian economy around $17 billion a year (1) . Although both the 
number of crashes and the crash rates (crashes per kilometer) have 
been reduced dramatically in the past 30 years, recent statistics 
show that 1,463 persons were killed on Australian roads in 2008 (2). 
Of more concern, it appears that reductions may have stagnated in 
recent years, leaving policy makers searching for other options that 
might lead to significant drops in crash rates. Although engineering-
based methods for both roadway infrastructure and vehicles as well 
as regulation and enforcement will continue to play a critical role in 
future road safety initiatives, an area of growing interest is the use 
of kilometer-based financial mechanisms to encourage safer driving 
practices (3) . The notion here is that by linking what motorists are 
charged to both the kilometers they drive and the circumstances 
under which those kilometers are driven (e.g., nighttime driving, 
route choice, speeding), motorists will have the incentive to change 
behavior, and the overall risk and societal costs of accidents will be 
reduced ( 4). 
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In 2009 an experiment was conducted in Sydney, Australia, that 
aimed to facilitate and detect changes in driving behavior following 
the imposition of a kilometer-based charging regime focused around 
safer driving practices (5). The charging regime was focused on reduc-
ing kilometers, nighttime driving, and speeding, which are acknowl-
edged correlates with increased crash risk (6). The experiment 
encompassed a 10-week field study of 148 Sydney motorists whose 
driving patterns were monitored by using Global Positioning System 
(GPS) technology before and after the implementation of a charging 
regime. Motorists were financially rewarded for any net reductions in 
vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT), nighttime driving, and speeding in 
the after period relative to the before period. The main findings of the 
experiment are reported, with the focus on aggregate-level change in 
VKT, nighttime driving, and speeding. These quantitative measures of 
change are supplemented by the findings of exit interviews designed 
to determine more about the reasons behind the observed changes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Efforts to provide a financial incentive for safer on-road driving behav-
ior are most visible through commercial pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) 
insurance options, in which premiums are differentiated according 
to kilometers driven and in some cases time, location, and speed (3). 
Technology has facilitated even more sophisticated offerings focused 
on how a vehicle is being driven, or pay-how-you-drive. For instance, 
the Co-operative Insurance Company has recently launched a product 
that offers premium reductions for young drivers based on their brak-
ing and acceleration, cornering, speeding, and time of driving (http:// 
www.co-operativebank.co.uk). These behaviors are monitored via a 
smart box, which transmits the information to a server that computes 
adjustments to the premiums based accordingly. Although not widely 
available in Australia as yet, PAYD schemes are available in various 
forms in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, 
among other places (4). Commercial sensitivities preclude details of 
how rates are set and although some aggregate indicators of the out-
comes of the programs are provided, rarely is information provided on 
the before-and-after changes in driving. One exception was a recent 
government-sponsored trial of PAYD insurance in Dallas-Fort Worth, 
Texas (7). Motorists were monitored for 12 months (divided into two 
6-month periods) before and after the imposition of a distance-based 
scheme that rewarded them at US$25 for each 5% reduction in miles 
driven up to a cap of $350 ($175 per period). 
Various academic studies have focused on exploring how variable-
rate pricing regimes might affect motorist behavior, largely from 
the perspective of congestion mitigation (8, 9). The closest paral-
lel to the current investigation was a hypothetical investigation of 
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the effects of various PAYD insurance schemes being proposed for 
young drivers in the Netherlands (4). The approach used was to set 
a base rate, which in this case was taken as the average insurance 
premium divided by the annual kilometers driven. The base rate 
was then adjusted upward by factors (derived from various sources) 
reflective of higher accident risk, including driving at night versus 
driving during the day and driving on urban roads versus motorways. 
The authors concluded that the most aggressive scheme, including 
obligatory time and road type differentiation, could reduce crashes 
by over 5%. No published evidence is currently available on how this 
program changed behavior in reality. 
Other studies have looked at specific methods of using financial 
mechanisms to change behavior, primarily speeding. Mazureck and 
Van Hattern detail a study in the Netherlands in which motorists were 
paid to stay within the speed limit and maintain a safe following dis-
tance (10). Results indicated that speeding was reduced by around 
20% based on a reward of €0.04 for every 15 s spent not speed-
ing (€ I = $1.28 in 2006); notably, once the rewards were removed, 
drivers largely reverted to their original behavior. In a similar study, 
the Swedish Intelligent Economic Speed Adaptation study involved 
directly linking incentives to actual speeding behavior. Participants 
were paid a lump sum bonus, which was reduced by a certain charge 
for every minute participants drove above the speed limit within the 
study period (1/ ). 
STUDY METHODS 
Although full details of the methods discussed here are provided by 
Greaves et al. (5) and by Greaves and Fifer (6), the process is briefly 
described. Motorists were recruited to undertake a 12-week study of 
driving in Sydney involving both a GPS and online survey compo-
nent for which they would receive a gift card worth AU$30 (AU$ 1 = 
$0.90 in 2009). There was no mention of the potential to make money 
through changes in driving at the recruitment phase because it might 
have influenced both the decision to participate and the driving behav-
ior of those who did participate. The study, approved by University 
of Sydney ethics in 2009, encompassed five phases: a 5-week before 
period of GPS monitoring (GPS Before), establishment of the charg-
ing regime, a stated-choice survey completed at the end of the GPS 
Before phase (SC Before), a 5-week after period of GPS monitoring 
(GPS After), and a stated-choice survey completed at the end of the 
SC After phase (Figure 1). To cross-check the VKT coming from the 
GPS device, three odometer readings were also taken at installation, 
after the GPS Before phase, and at the completion of the GPS After 
phase. Motorists also completed a survey capturing facets of person-
ality, risk aversion, and behavior before the GPS monitoring began 
(12). Finally, exit interviews were completed to gather participant 
reaction to the survey itself as well as provide further evidence on 
whether any observed changes in behavior were due to the charges 
or other factors. 




Week 1 to Week 5 I Week6 I 
I I 
FIGURE 1 Study overview. 
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TABLE 1 Final Charging Rates Used in GPS After Phase [61 
Daytime($) Nighttime ($) 
Age 
Group Nonspeeding Speeding Nonspeeding Speeding 
17-30 0.20 0.60 0.80 2.40 
31-65 0.15 0.45 0.60 1.20 
The purpose of the 5-week before period ofGPS monitoring was to 
establish a detailed profile of driving routines and patterns. A website 
was developed enabling participants to view their travel and add trip-
specific information (e.g., who was driving, trip purpose) via a Google 
map-style interface developed by the project team. Concurrent with 
this period was the development of the charging regime (Table 1), 
which was based on scientific considerations (crash-cost and crash-
risk analysis) as well as pragmatic ones (easily understandable, suf-
ficient to encourage a change in behavior, within the project budget) 
(6). The information collected in the before period was combined with 
the charging regime to establish a starting budget for each motorist that 
reflected the combined effects of their kilometers driven, nighttime 
driving, and speeding. Motorists were then informed that they could 
make money on the basis of reductions in these measures relative to 
the before period. A further 5-week period of GPS monitoring (the 
GPS After phase) followed to detect any changes made; participants 
were notified daily through the website how they were faring against 
the budget. At the end of the trial, participants received a financial 
payment corresponding to the money they had left (participants going 
over the budget were not obliged to pay). 
To give a sense of what these rates could mean in terms of potential 
payouts to participants and the project budget, a sensitivity analysis 
was conducted according to assumed changes in VKT, nighttime 
driving, and speeding over the 5-week after period (Table 2). The 
basis for these assumptions was evidence collected from various vol-
untary travel behavior change interventions conducted in Australia 
and in-depth interviews conducted with pilot participants for this 
project. These computations were based on the before-period driving 
of the 125 participants who qualified for the charging phase of the 
experiment. Starting budgets (charges incurred in the before period) 
ranged from $25 to $915, reflecting the heterogeneity of driving hab-
its of motorists in the study. Under the various hypothesized behav-
ioral changes, average incentives ranged from $21 for women 31 
to 65 years of age to $119 for women 17 to 30 years of age, with a 
maximum project liability of just under $10,000. 
RECRUITMENT AND SAMPLE DETAILS 
Participants were recruited through an online panel according to 
strict criteria that reflected the main aims of the study as well as 
practicalities about using the GPS equipment. In terms of the main 
SC'Afte( 
GPS 'After' Device Retrieval 
Exit Survey 
I I I 
Week 7 to Week 11 I Week 12 I I I I I 
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TABLE 2 Behavioral Change Scenarios and Projected Incentives 
Category Starting Budget" Scenario l Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Reduction(%) 
VKT na 5 8 12 15 
Night driving na 10 15 15 20 
Speeding na 15 25 35 45 
Males, age 17-30 
Average($) 355 41 64 87 108 
Range($) 85-630 9-84 14- 131 19-171 24-210 
Females, age 17-30 
Average($) 405 45 71 96 119 
Range($) 105-8 15 6-lll 9-175 13-234 17-290 
Males, age 31-65 
Average($) 315 32 50 68 85 
Range($) 30-870 3-116 5- 182 7-241 9-301 
Females, age 31-65 
Average($) 233 21 33 45 56 
Range($) 25-915 l-56 2-87 3-116 4-145 
Projected incentive 35,950 3,708 5,831 7,895 9,855 
payout($) 
NOTE: na =not applicable. 
"Reflects combined effects of kilometers driven, nighttime driving, and speeding from tbe before period multiplied 
by the relevant rates in Table I . 
aims of the study, only participants with a valid license from one-car 
households were recruited, and they needed to be the primary driver 
and drive more than 2 days a week on average. In terms of practi-
calities, cars needed a working cigarette lighter that did not stay on 
when the engine was turned off and drain the battery (a problem 
for a small proportion of high-end vehicles in Australia) and were 
parked off-street at night. Unfortunately, the parking criterion was 
imposed following the pilot study when two devices were lost in 
the first week because they were in vehicles that were parked on the 
street and were stolen. (These were the only two devices out of 150 
that were lost in the entire study.) 
The original sample included 148 motorists, of which 119 were 
given the charging regime (the target group) and 29 were not (the 
control group). Of the 148 participants who started the experiment, 
125 completed all phases with 116/119 (97%) of target participants 
and 9/29 (31 %) of control participants complying, respectively. 
Twelve dropped out because of loss of interest or fatigue (all in 
the control group), whereas two target group participants and four 
control group participants had incomplete prompted-recall data for 
the comparison time periods. Intuitively, the opportunity to make 
money should have kept the target participants interested; unfortu-
nately, some control participants lost interest and motivation as the 
study extended well past the original 12 weeks because of delays in 
recruitment and the time required for the stated-choice component 
of the work. 
In terms of other issues, despite alerting screeners about the need 
for constant power from cigarette lighters, three participants were 
still lost from the study because of this problem. Another two partic-
ipants dropped out stating computer issues, meaning that they could 
not access the website. Because of the higher-than-anticipated loss 
of sample, those participants with eligible before data were invited 
back for a further 5-week phase of charging (Phase 2), which ran 
from February 22,2010, to March 28, 2010. This phase resulted in 
another 17 participants in the target sample giving a net total of 133 
( 116 + 17) for further consideration. 
These 133 participants were then subjected to several data quality 
checks to verify to the maximum extent possible that the changes 
were genuine. This procedure resulted in the removal of 29 par-
ticipants because of irreconcilable differences between the GPS-based 
VKTestimates and the odometer-based VKT readings (15 participants) 
and those taking extended holidays in the after period ( 14 participants). 
Two of those taking holidays were invited back, so a final usable 
sample of 106 participants was left for further analysis. Although 
this final number (particularly of young men) may seem low, it must 
be stressed that it is reflective of the number of vehicles included 
in the sample, not the number of drivers. The issue here is that 54/ 
106 vehicles were in fact driven by more than one participant over 
the study period with a total pool of drivers of 181. Although this 
number captures the reality of what would happen if, say, a scheme 
of this nature were implemented, it is important to interpret results 
in this light. 
The final sample breakdown was as follows: 
• Original target sample+ Phase 2 sample, 133; 
• Extended holiday in before or after period, 14; 
• Irreconcilable differences in VKT, 15; 
• Final vehicle sample for before and after analysis, 106; 
• Demographics of study participants: 
-Men, 17 to 30 years of age, 5; 
-Men, 3 I to 45 years of age, 19; 
-Men, 46 to 65 years of age, 20; 
-Women, 17 to 30 years of age, 21; 
-Women, 31 to 45 years of age, 24; and 
-Women, 46 to 65 years of age, 17; 
• Vehicles with multiple drivers, 54; and 
• Total drivers in sample: 181. 
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FIGURE 2 Comparison of starting amount and final payout by participant. 
RESULTS 
Aggregate Comparisons 
Of the 106 participants and vehicles who qualified for the before-
and-after comparison, 65 (61 %) made money, and 41 (39%) did 
not and received no money (as stated earlier, they did not have to 
pay back the additional amount). For those making money, payouts 
ranged from $2 to $619 with an average payout of $116 (median 
payout was $77). A pertinent question is whether the amount of 
the starting budget had any influence on the propensity of change, 
since logic might suggest that someone would be more motivated 
by making several hundred dollars than a few dollars. When viewed 
overall, the answer appears to be yes, with those making money 
starting with an average budget of $350 compared with $240 for 
those not making money. However, the correlation between starting 
amount and final payout (r = 0.59) suggests that this use of averages 
may not be telling the full story. This suggestion is confirmed by 
Figure 2, which suggests considerable intraparticipant variability 
with some participants on very high starting amounts making little 
or no money. The implications here are that participants appear var-
ied in both their capability and their willingness to make changes for 
financial rewards computed from their actual driving. 
Table 3 provides the overall changes in key travel character-
istics across the sampling period. The 95% confidence limit was 
constructed by using the approach advocated by Stopher and 
Greaves for assessing the significance of changes in behavior from 
panel data (13). VKT was reduced by 113.7 km or 3.2 km/day, an 
average reduction of 9.8%. However, the sample was evenly split 
by those who increased their VKT and those who decreased VKT. 
TABLE 3 Overall Change in Travel Characteristics Between 5-Week Before and After Periods 
Sample Behavior Before 
AverageVKT 1,164.3 
Nighttime VKT 120.5 ( 1 0.4%) 
Speeding VKT 155.0 (13.3%) 
Trips 142.2 
Travel time (min) 36:15:58 
NOTE: Number of sample participants= 106. 
"Paired sample Hest. 
After 
1,050.5 





-113.7 (-9 .8%) (p = .02)" 
1.2 (1.0%)(p = .91) 
-64.8 (-41.8%) (p = .00) 
-12.4 (-8.7%) (p = .00) 
-{)3:30: 12 (-9.7%) (p = .02) 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Change 
-160.0 (-14%) to -84.8 (-6%) 
-10.0 (-8%) to 12.4 (10%) 
-76.9 (-50%) to -52.8 (-34%) 
-16.7 (-12%) to-8.1 (-6%) 
-{)4:57:31 (-14%) to -{)2:02:53 (-6%) 
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TABLE 4 Change in VKT by Trip Purpose 
95% Confidence Interval Percent of Sample 
VKT Purpose Before After Change of the Change Reducing 
Work and work related 324.4 290.3 -34.0 (-10.5%) (p = .16) -58.1 (-18%) to -10.0 (-3%) 50" 
Shopping and personal business 214.5 216.7 2.2 ( I%) (p = .87) -10.9 (-5%) to 15.3 (7%) 54 
Social-recreational 293.1 241.5 -51.6 (-17.6%) (p = .02) -72.8 (-25%) to -30.3 (-10%) 60 
NoTE: Number of participants = I 06. 
"Twelve participants recorded no work VKT in either the before or after phases, so this computation was based on the 94 participants who did. 
Nighttime kilometers increased marginally in the after period but 
the changes were not statistically significant (p = 0.91 ), although 
half the sample reduced their nighttime VKT. The number of kilo-
meters spent speeding decreased by 64.8 km (1.9 km/day) with 
three-fourths of the sample reducing their speeding. Overall the 
proportion of distance speeding fell by 4.7%, which, coupled with 
the decrease in VKT, meant that the proportion of kilometers spent 
speeding in the after period fell by 41.8%. The number of trips 
also fell, from 142.2 (4.1 trips/day) to 129.8 trips (3.7 trips/day) , a 
reduction of 8.7%. Finally, the average time spent driving fell from 
around 62 min/day to 56 min/day, a drop of 9.7%. 
VKT by Trip Purpose 
Analysis of the changes in VKT by trip purpose (Table 4) shows 
that for work and work-related trips, VKT was reduced by 10.5%, 
although this value was not significant at the 95% confidence level. 
Half the sample reduced their work VKT, similar to the pattern 
for overall VKT. Shopping and personal business VKT margin-
ally increased (not significant), and social and recreational VKT 
decreased by 17.6% (significant at the 95% confidence level). The 
results suggest not surprisingly that, overall, participants had the 
most flexibility in reducing travel that might be considered more 
discretionary. Perhaps more surprising is the lack of flexibility for 
shopping and personal business; this finding suggests that, overall, 
participants were unwilling or unable to change these patterns. 
Money Makers 
Analysis of the results for the 65 participants who made money 
shows, as expected, more marked changes in VKT and speeding as 
well as a substantial and statistically significant decrease in night-
time driving (Table 5). VKT decreased by around 26% with 82% of 
the sample reducing, and the distance spent speeding decreased by 
around 62%, with 92% reducing. 
Not Money Makers 
Focusing on the 41 participants who did not make money, Table 6 
shows that overall there was a 25% increase in VKT and all increased 
their VKT in the after period . Nighttime driving also increased sub-
stantially for this group. Speeding decreased marginally, although 
the change was statistically insignificant. Though almost half the 
sample reduced their speeding VKT, this finding suggests that per-
haps simply being made aware that speeding was being monitored 
was in itself an important factor affecting behavior. 
Disaggregate Comparisons 
Although the aggregate-level comparisons indicate overall change 
across the sample, evidently there is considerable heterogene-
ity within the sample. It is also not clear from the evidence thus 
far why people might or might not have changed behavior and to 
what extent this change was due to the financial mechanisms. In 
this section of the results a more disaggregate approach is taken 
toward changes in the key parameters-VKT, speeding, and night-
time driving-by considering both the numerical evidence and the 
qualitative evidence from the exit interviews. 
Vehicle Kilometers Traveled 
Changes in VKT by participant are shown in Figure 3; by way of inter-
pretation, those changes falling to the right of the line reduced VKT, 
and those to the left of the line increased VKT. The results reinforce 
the earlier findings that although there is an even split in terms of 
those who increased or decreased VKT, those decreasing VKT did so 
by a substantially larger amount. To focus on the largest reductions in 
VKT, the participant with the biggest net reduction-from 2,590 km 
in the before period to 294 km in the after period-clearly aroused 
the suspicion of the research team. Follow-up interviews revealed 
that the participant (who drove a considerable distance to work in 
TABLE 5 Overall Change in VKT, Nighttime Driving, and Speeding Between 5-Week Before and After Periods 
95% Confidence Interval Percent of Sample 
Participant Before After Change of the Change Reducing 
VKT 1288.3 951.0 -337 (-26.2%) (p = .00) -395.9 (-31 %) to -278.5 (-22%) 82 
Nighttime VKT 148.1 (11.5%) 110.3(11.6%) -37.8 (-25.5%) (p = .00) -47.7 (-32%) to -27.9 (-19%) 66 
Speeding VKT 168.7 (13.1%) 64.4 (6.8%) -104.3 (-6 1.8%) (p = .00) -121.1 (-72%) to - 87.5 (-52%) 92 
NOTE: Number of participants= 65. Those who made money only. 
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TABLE 6 Overall Change in VKT, Nighttime Driving, and Speeding Between 5-Week Before and After Periods 
95% Confidence Interval Percent of Sample 
Participant Before After Change of the Change Reducing 
Average VKT 967.6 1208.2 241 (24.9%) (p = .00) 214.0 (22%) to 267.1 (28%) 0 
Nighttime VKT 76.9 (7.9%) 139.9 (11.6%) 63.0 (82.0%) (p = .00) 43.4 (56%) to 82.7 (108%) 24 
Speeding VKT 133.4 ( 13.8%) 131.1 (10.9%) -2.2 (-1.7%) (p = .83) -12.7 (-9%) to 8.2 (6%) 46 
NOTE: Number of panicipants = 41. Those who did not make money only. 
western Sydney) had entered into an informal carpooling agreement 
with a neighbor in which they agreed to use the neighbor's car for 
the majority of the 5-week after period and split the difference. The 
participant with the second-largest reduction (2,520 km in the before 
period to 446 km in the after period) explained that this change was 
largely due to the fact that in the before period the car was shared with 
her daughter, who drove a lot for work. During the after period, the 
daughter purchased her own car and stopped driving the participant's 
car. Ideally, a second GPS device would have been installed in the 
daughter's car, but clearly this was not possible. 
Responses in the exit interviews gave some sense of changes in 
personal circumstances that might have affected driving during the 
study period. Ten percent of participants indicated a major change 
in personal circumstances in the before period, 20% in the interim 
period, and 25 % in the after period. Among the reasons provided 
were giving birth, being hospitalized for some reason, death or seri-
ous illness in the family, moving house, changing jobs, and someone 
else using the car more (or less). Whatever the precise reason, the 
issue is that even within a relatively short time period (3 months), a 
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significant number of participants faced events that affected driving 
above and beyond the imposition of the charging regime. 
To gain more insight on this issue, participants were also asked, 
"During the charging phase did you reduce (a) work-related driving, 
(b) social and recreational driving, and (c) shopping and personal 
business driving to earn a financial reward and to what extent would 
you reduce them if the reward was increased?" The results are shown 
in Figure 4. 
In terms of work-related travel, more than 80% of participants 
said they did not reduce work-related driving because of the money; 
the graph suggests that the incentive needed to be substantially 
higher to see a meaningful change. This finding does not seem to 
support what was found in the observational data, where there was a 
substantial reduction in work-related VKT and a roughly 50:50 split 
in terms of those reducing. The results for social and recreational 
trips are more aligned with what was seen in the GPS data; this 
finding reinforced the notion that participants generally have more 
latitude and flexibility to change discretionary travel. The shopping 
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FIGURE 3 Changes in VKT in before and after periods. 
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FIGURE 4 Exit interview responses to question about motivation for reduction in !al work-related driving, 
!bl social and recreational driving , end !cl shopping and personal business driving. 
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trends more closely. This result supported the empirical findings in 
terms of the proportion who reduced shopping and personal busi-
ness VKT, even if there was no net reduction in overall shopping 
and personal business VKT across the sample. 
Speeding 
The overall results for speeding, although impressive, necessitate a 
closer look to establish where these reductions are coming from. A 
distribution of speeding across the sample (not shown) revealed that 
at some point all participants sped, with one-third of participants 
speeding more than 15% of the distance driven; this finding is argu-
ably indicative of more systematic and deliberate speeding behav-
ior. Clearly, the magnitude of speeding must also be factored in, an 
issue that thus far has only been analyzed for the before period (12). 
The change in overall speeding by participant is presented in 
Figure 5; those points falling to the right of the diagonal line rep-
resent reduced speeding, and those to the left increased speeding. 
In addition to reinforcing the aggregate comparisons provided 
earlier, it is particularly notable that some of the highest speeders 
reduced speeding substantially; for instance, the highest speeder in 
the before period at 35% reduced his speeding to 3% in the after 
period. Overall , only 10% of participants now sped more than 15% 
of the distance driven although it is still of concern that 25% of par-
ticipants actually increased their speeds in the charging phase; this 
finding suggests no impact of the money or the monitoring. 
Exit interviews asked participants, "During the charging phase 
did you reduce speeding to earn financial rewards and to what extent 
would you reduce speeding if the reward was increased?" The 





























heavily influenced by the charge (proxied by the response of "com-
pletely" or "often"). As the incentive increases, clearly the influence 
of the money grows, but it is arguably of more interest that there is 
a hard core of just over 20% of motorists who apparently will not 
reduce speeding for financial reasons. This finding is similar to what 
was observed in the empirical data, in which 23% of motorists did 
not decrease speeding in the after period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although a number of recent investigations have been conducted 
into motorist responses to various types of charging regimes, few 
have focused on driving behavior per se. The behavioral response 
of motorists is reported here to a variable-rate charging scheme 
designed to encourage safer driving behavior and reduce exposure 
to crash risk, specifically kilometers driven, nighttime driving, and 
speeding. Overall, although participants made money, a substantial 
proportion (39%) did not; this finding suggests that they were unwill-
ing or unable to change for the monetary incentives offered. Particu-
larly when one considers that this change only involved a relatively 
short period of time (5 weeks), it demonstrates how difficult it was 
for people to break travel habits and routines. 
Speeding (which was the easiest thing to change) was reduced 
substantially following the imposition of the charging scheme, 
although a hard core of perennial speeders remained. It is not 
conclusive to what extent this result was due to the money or the 
monitoring, but it is likely a function of both, judging from the exit 
interviews. VKT was reduced by I 0% overall, a large reduction. 
However, the sample was equally split between those decreasing 
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FIGURE 5 Changes in speeding in before and after periods. 
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FIGURE 6 Exit interview responses to question about incentives. 
in comparative driving measures and for many participants the 
difficulties involved in reducing car dependency, an assertion again 
corroborated by the exit interviews. 
Clearly, as with any study of this nature, there are caveats relat-
ing to the sample (size, composition, representativeness, etc.), the 
technology, and how to definitively establish causality between the 
charging regime and intervention and observed behavioral change. 
To address these issues, the nature of the study (appealed to some 
and not to others), the fact that it was an opt-in study, and the avail-
able survey budget all had ramifications for the sample. It is also 
acknowledged that the study may have attracted more ri sk-averse 
drivers in general (on the basis of an average risk aversion score 
of 3.73 out of 5 for participants in which the higher score is for 
the more risk adverse). These points are true for all studies of this 
nature and as long as one is candid about how the results should be 
interpreted and used, this practice is accepted. 
In the current effort, the purpose was to administer a sophisticated 
pilot study to identify if there was enough evidence of behavioral 
change to warrant further studies of this nature, and the authors argue 
that there is. In terms of the technology, the main issue with in-vehicle 
monitoring is to minimize or eliminate the potential for drivers to 
inadvertently or deliberately tamper with the setup. It is the authors ' 
opinion that although perfect driver compliance may not be achiev-
able, improvements can be made. For instance, a device with the same 
capability as the one used here has recently been developed that plugs 
into the onboard diagnostic port out of the sight of the driver. Other 
touted options include installing the device in the engine manage-
ment system; in the current study, as well as being substantially more 
expensive, this option was prohibited under university ethics and is 
also not foolproof against tampering. 
The issue of establishing causality between the fiscal interven-
tion and behavior change is clearly imperative. In this study, it was 
attempted to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative evidence 
to establish this causality. The control group, despite suffering from 
a general loss of interest, did demonstrate the importance per se of 
the financial intervention in keeping people interested given that no 
one from the target group dropped out in the after period. The exit 
surveys were a useful addition to the study that enabled exploration 
of some of the "why" questions behind behavioral changes. Argu-
ably, given the complex patterns of household driving, individual-
level analysis is required to further understand the reasons for the 
nature of the changes within each household, something which is 
currently under way. 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, this study serves as a use-
ful pilot that should be used as a reference for future studies explor-
ing issues of this nature. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated 
that it appears possible to significantly change aggregate behaviors 
(particularly speeding) of a segment of the motoring public through 
financial leverages based on rewarding better behavior. Such a 
notion is being taken up through the previously discussed Pay-How-
You-Drive products being increasingly offered through the commer-
cial insurance sector. Although undoubted challenges remain, GPS 
technology opens up the possibility for developing greater equity in 
charging systems that reflect not just the kilometers driven but when, 
where, and how they are driven. 
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